This paper will focus on the management and improvement of equipment availability with better prevention of failures. It is focused on one of process control tasks: preliminary risks analysis. The result from this study is a method which empowered engineers and managers decision about actions to implement regarding negative events in their manufacture. The article proposes a risk based maintenance method, which relies on the regular and automatic XSGDWH RI HTXLSPHQWV ¶ ULVN DQDO\VHV LQFOXGLQJ equipment failure history. The associated aided decision tool is presented. The article is structured in four parts. After a risk management domain literature overview, the paper presents the new risk based maintenance method. A case study in semiconductor industry shows that FMECA can be employed in a dynamic way for managing maintenance activities. The alternative model simplifies and makes more reliable risks identification and estimation. Results and a short discussion end the article
INTRODUCTION:
Semiconductor industry is characterized by complex and expensive manufacturing process, continuous technologies development and innovation. During the production cycle, equipment failures and breakdowns affect seriously cycle time, product quality and then the production cost. This context imposes to maintain a relevant, efficient, effective and dynamic control of manufacturing process. At the heart of this control plan are risks analyses. Following ISOTS recommendations, FMECA (Dod, 1980) is the recommended method for analyzing probable dysfunctions, their origins and to capitalize these information. These documents are also given to the customers in order to demonstrate that major probable risks are under control with associated action plans. However, using the FMECA method in a classical way stays a time consuming task and is often inefficient to manage risks. This paper demonstrates that it is possible to use FMECA method in a more dynamic environment, continuously updated by operational events. This improves the risk analysis efficiency and prevents its obsolescence. Equipment events are generally a main scrap contributor in the manufacturing process. But equipment FMECA are very hard to update and maintain in a continuous mode. Semiconductor industry fall in this case, equipments FMECA are generally complex to sustain due to the number of functional modules. Is it possible to make a dynamic link between the daily factory events and the complex equipment FMECA?
Our approach consists to establish a continuous bond between factory events (coming from corrective maintenance) and block hardware risk analyses. This approach allows changing mind set concerning FMECA usage on the following points: -FMECA can be updated on a regular basis.
-They can then be used has a reliable operational action plan by operational actors. -Equipment improvement can be prioritized based on risk classification.
This study presents a method to enhance information about risks in a manufacturing facility. (Higgins and Mobley, 2001) . Despite these methods, processes and equipments complexity didQ ¶WDOORZWRVXSSUHVVfailures and still affect cycle time at a non negligible level. Many approaches and models were developed for maintenance planning and strategy improvement (Gertsbakh, 2000) . Caldeira Duarte et al. (2006) consider that the most critical issue is to determine the optimum preventive maintenance frequency. After a brief literature overview about reliability theory, new preventive maintenance management algorithms are proposed as well as a cost function for preventive and corrective tasks. All of these approaches mentioned above are focused on improving equipments reliability and minimizing costs. They studied equipment parts performances after failures occurrences and deduce maintenance intervals. Risk of failure is hardly integrated into planning models.
As explained in introduction, industrials are asked by their customers to deliver evidences of a process risk management policy. At the maintenance level, a first step toward this requirement is named RFM (Risk Focused Maintenance). It was developed for this purpose. It consists in defining action priority in accordance with the risk level (B. Tomic, 1993) . Cassanelli and al. (2006) consider the analysis precision of a risk as a base for FMECA efficiency. They are describing how to update and follow FMECA documents. They advice to have a constant perfect match between: the risk document, product and equipment evolution. Herrou and Elghorba (2005) presented a case study for compressor system that uses this FMECA approach for minimization of indirect maintenance costs. In addition, they show that this approach based on risk analysis, allow defining requirements in terms of reliability and a maintenance policy for the equipment and its components. Redmill (2002) got more focus on risk analysis steps process (identification, analysis and assessment). He highlighted that the human factor is a key component for VXFFHVV RI WKH PHWKRG ³there are many techniques for hazard identification, and all depend on human observation, judgement and creativity´ Risk analysis is presented as a tool to support decision-making.
Where RFM approaches considered risks as a part of the decision of maintaining or not, Risks Based Maintenance (RNM) approaches kept it central. Khan and Haddara (2003) describe the method for maintenance planning improvement based on Risk-based maintenance and develop three modules: risk estimation, risk evaluation and maintenance planning module. The first module is about the development of different failure scenarios, consequences on system and determination of associated risks. Maintenance planning is then reviewed taking into account risk level aspects. A maintenance planning optimisation case study for HVAC (Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning) is shown. However this study suffers from a drawback; when a negative event occurs, risks analysis are not updated. Their obsolescence induces the maintenance planning obsolescence. Kazunari et al. (2004) and Krishnasamy et al. (2005) show other case studies and the method was adapted to other domain. Arunraj and Maiti (2007) made a synthesis of the RBM methods, present the different steps ( Fig.1 ) and describe their main drawbacks. All the modules are detailed as well as factors affecting risk analysis evaluation quality. Three factors affecting risk analysis quality evaluation are highlighted and based on 25 RBM studies it is shown that few main contributors are affecting these factors:
Factor1: Hazard identification and initial consequence analysis. The main contributor is the quality of data and their retrieval during the risk analysis.
Factor 2: Risk estimation; they found three majors drawbacks: (1) the method employed for the risk calculation, (2) its application frequency (once per week, SHU PRQWKV« DQG FRQVHTXHQFHV DWWDFKHG IRr each ranking (which kind of action are linked).
Factor 3: Results: risks analysis impacts are not properly measured in a quantitative or qualitative way. These results point out the need for improving the quality of risk analysis. Source of information, update frequency and risk estimation method must be redefined.
The literature review process make an incursion into the design community, with the work of Tumer and Stone (2001) . They present a method to introduce information of dysfunction during the design phase of functionalities. This method is named RED (Risk in Early Design phase). Their connection is based on three major points: (1) Parts breakdowns events storage, (2) Matrix linking parts and functions, (3) translation of parts breakdowns into risks of functional failure and database update. Their work presents an operational way to connect functional analysis into related risks and allows the automatic update of risks evaluation. Even this case study took place the design community it has been a major source of inspiration for the model proposal in the next paragraph.
This short literature review about risks based maintenance, point out that efforts need to be focused on data retrieval and updated ± as automatic as possible -to prevent risks analyses obsolescence. The foundation of the proposition relies on previous analyses. A particular attention has been paid to connect as smooth as possible events and preliminary risks analyses.
MODEL PROPOSAL AND CASE STUDY:
A first extension was done by Bassetto et Al (2007) for connecting FMECA and process quality problem solving procedure, in semiconductor industry. The main advance was to reanalyse risks ranking regarding new issues facts. However, the main drawback of their extension was to rely on the good will of managers involved in the process to sustain the manual risk update.
A major source of event relies on process equipment. That is why we estimate that collecting real equipment events is a foundation for improving risk management. Then an additional layer of data analysis is proposed. Through heuristics, the frequency is updated bringing accuracy at risks identification and evaluation.
Proposal:
Toward a generic model: Classical RBM and risk analysis method are using human knowledge at each DQDO\VLV ¶ steps. That makes these methods quite heavy to use and in most of the cases not user friendly. Quality of the input information depends greatly on human expertise, interest to the method and capability to access the information. To overcome these issues the first step will consist to describe a model which automates as much as possible hazard estimation, data collection and risk evaluation.
Central to this model of risks, is the concept of a failure mode. It is a text. Linked at it, is its context: the equipment part or function, its effects, its causes, linked controls and their rankings ± occurrence, severity, detection, UHGXQGDQF\« :LWK VXFK D VWUXFWXUH each real failure, occurring on tools can be compared at failure issued during preliminary risks analyses, for the same context (tool, part, function). From this comparison, failures and their ranking can be updated.
Each failure is logged and saved in CMMS database. Historical data allows classifying failures using decision criteria: Severity (downtime effect) and Occurrence (of the failure).
Model treatment method:
A risk is classified if its occurrence and severity is greater than a predefined level (Trigger Level: TL Seoul, Korea, July 6-11, 2008 
Case study:
A risk is described by a particular class. The context is very structure in this case study by equipment decomposition. This leads at defining Item/function as an attribute of risks. This introduces a constraint: having the same description of Item/Function than in the equipment decomposition. An instance of the risks model mentioned in 3.2, is presented Fig 4. The model presents also possible links between equipment failure (maintenance events) and risks descriptions. A risk can be generated by several causes and it can produce several effects on the equipment. It is modelled by a particular class. Context is included as an attribute of this class. A failure is generated by several causes and can produce several undesired equipment effects.
If the failure is properly described, it can be possible to pass from a failure to risk identification. Decision criteria are introduced in order to fully describe the association risk vs failure. These decision criteria must be verified and validated to allow the information transfer from failure to risk database. Preventive maintenance frequency and released criteria are usually fixed by workshop maintenance engineers in accordance with production constraints. In order to improve cost and cycle time, time to repair needs to be minimized in order to restart the tool in production as soon as possible.
In one hand, in the CMMS, each logged maintenance action is connected at an equipment part, involved in the breakdown. Each equipment belongs to a workshop. In the other hand, each equipment FMECA is classified by tool type and workshop. This similar structure can be synchronized so as having the same nomenclature in both software. This particular structure is illustrated Fig 5. It becomes possible to integrate each failure saved in the CMMS in the correspondent FMECA document.
To develop this study, a pilot workshop has been chosen. A first study of the maintenance events descriptions (named in the CMMS failure codes) showed that most of time, actual configuration doesQ ¶W DOORZ D SUHFLVH description of the breakdown. To ensure the relevance of information to be integrated into FMECA, a revision and PRGLILFDWLRQRIWKH³failure cRGHV´have been carried out.
CMMS Structure
FMECA tool classification . are now at least in a correspondence table or at best equal. These two texts can be compared automatically.
b. Calculate occurrence and induced total downtime for each failure (Severity).
Decision criteria can be automatically proposed by using standard tables. Occurrence risk level (Rank) calculation is performed using a corporate quotation grid (Table 1) which associates number (From 1 to 10) to event frequency.
Tab1. Occurrence grid (corporate)
Occurrence: To follow the occurrence on a monthly basis, and introduce a weight taking into account failure reoccurrence a new table using a unified scale table calculated on a 12 months period has been introduced (Table 2) .
17th IFAC World Congress (IFAC'08) Seoul, Korea, July 6-11, 2008 For example, if a failure mode noted FM occurs between 2 and 4 times, during the 1 st month (M01) of review, its occurrence will be set at 7 (1 st column, 3 rd line). The VHFRQG PRQWK 0 LI LW GRHVQ ¶W RFFXU DJDLQ WKLV YDOXH will be ³GHSUHFLDWHG´IURPWR nd column, 3 rd line). At the opposite, if the event appears again, it can stay in this weight or pass it in the category ³EHWZHHQ 4 and 30 apparitions´. In this new category, the failure mode occurrence is increased of 1, at 8. This table allows a simple treatment of events by updating occurrence weights.
Tab2. Occurrence matrix on a period of 12 months
Severity: Severity level for each failure refers also to a corporate ranking grid. Severity rank is linked to equipment downtime duration. Outlier values of failure duration can affects the average in an erratic way. In order to minimise this effect, downtime duration is calculated using the median on a monthly basis by failure type.
A monthly report is produced at this step. It contains all failures with associated Severity*Occurrence quotation.
c. Select failures with decision criteria (risk quotation) higher than TL (Input for risk analysis).
Starting from the above report, SEV*OCC greater than Trigger Level (TL) are classified to prepare FMECA data base loading. TL value is fixed according to global process control rules for the entire factory. 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION:
Results: After two months of this systematic update twenty additional critical risks in the pilot workshop have been generated. Engineers discovered that most of these risks came from repetitive failures and were not seen previously due to the systematic ranking error on occurrence. Repetitive failures are time consuming. Even if they are less critical for the product, and easier to resolve, they must be treated in order to allow maintenance resources to deep fundamental issues.
FMECA update is simplified by this new method which identifies failure sources and critical equipments dysfunctions. All aspects of dysfunction are addressed, Cycle time and Cost through SEV*OCC > TL, Yield and cost can be done through SEV*DET > TL. The new method implies a complete review of existing risk identification in order to be coherent with maintenance database structure.
A regular FMECA database update, by maintenance events allows to enhanced knowledge about in line risks in the workshop.
Discussion: Results are promising. Two months are clearly not enough to iron out properly the entire system. However, most critical points identified at that time are: the establishment of links between maintenance and risks databases as well as the coherence between failure reports and risks definition. The coherency between texts of the µIDLOXUH PRGH ¶ DWWULEXWH RI WKH µULVN ¶ FODVV DQG WKH µGHVFULSWLRQ ¶ DWWULEXWH RI WKH µIDLOXUH ¶ FODVV LV D VWDUW Researches continue to smooth this link which requires an important organisational effort.
Today the FMECA update is more automatic. However, it still relies on engineering involvement during the definition of a join vocabulary between preliminary risks and maintenance teams. Managers remain key people by the emphasis they give in this new decision tool for action management, designed for them.
CONCLUSION & FUTUR WORK:
This paper is focused on production process improvement; it proposes a risk based maintenance tool enhancing management decisions. Using actual equipment history, a risk based maintenance model and method are developed and a case study is presented.
Establishing links between maintenance and risks databases allows improvement of failureV ¶ identification and prevention by using FMECA in a dynamic way. As a consequence of the model implementation, aideddecision tool has been developed for maintenance managers and field engineers. It helps in the management of their daily action plans. Cycle time, Cost and yield issue, are linked to operational dysfunction through FMECA approach in a comprehensive manner. By the possible automation of FMECA loading, well known heaviness of this method disappears.
Works are now on the deployment of this connection. The focus is done on the connection between events of failure ± risks analysis and resulting control plan. The possible deployment of this demonstrator, using the CRIS model (MIMOSA, 2006 ) is under investigation.
